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Abstract; 
 
While humanity has always found means to represent itself through material artefacts, the 
digital age and its attendant screen culture offer interesting ways to ubiquitously capture and 
to produce the self as a digital artefact online for personal and public consumption. The non-
stop capture of ourselves and our specular double are distinctive to digital living where the 
self can be objectified and consumed relentlessly, and where others can partake in consuming 
us. This chapter argues that the self remains a primal subject of interest online sustaining our 
„mirror moment‟ of self-discovery and recognition. Our fascination with the self is elevated 
further through our social and historical valorisation of the screen, which has over time stood 
for public spectacle and voyeurism. The screen, once the preserve of newsmakers, the 
celebrity or the morbid, has been disaggregated into a theatre for the consumption of the self. 
This ubiquitous consumption of the screen is premised through the concepts of the mirror and 
the screen in Chapter.  
 
Introduction 
The commodification of the self online for private and public consumption is a distinct 
element of our digital lives today. The ability to ubiquitously capture ourselves through the 
convergence of technologies means that the self has become a resonant subject (and object) 
as well as a site of production and consumption in the digital age. The presentation of the self 
online and the modes of representation where we consciously seek to affirm our presence on 
the screen is what is characterised here as self-curation. Self-curation is embedded into a 
duality of the everyday and equally in imagining oneself through different life experiences 
and backdrops, where imagination and fantasy are entwined with the ordinary and the 
perfunctory. Self-curation is then anchored through the politics and aesthetics of the digital 
architecture where selfhood is performed and amenable for consumption (both for the self 
and others).   
Self-curation cannot be solely premised through the idea of narcissism alone.  It certainly 
acknowledges a certain fascination with the self and its enactment and presence online 
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(Ibrahim 2011). In the process it reveals our intimate bind with technology, and in tandem 
technology‟s ability to extend our sense of self through an array of strategies and modes 
including the online image economies which image sharing social media platforms are part 
of. The performative elements enabled through the digital screen culture, and its back-end 
operations imagined through a tangled web of metrics and algorithms that turn human 
interactions into data, capture the frailties in performing our identities online in equal 
measure. Undeniably, these transactions can create new forms of social capital and attendant 
vulnerabilities. One may argue that in the new media economy, the self commodified 
relentlessly through a process of non-stop capture facilitated through the convergence of 
mobile telephony,  imaging and publishing technologies loses what Walter Benjamin (1995) 
terms as „aura‟. Or perhaps the representation of the self through technologically-mediated 
platforms illuminates its loss of authenticity in configuring the self in the digital platforms. 
The transcendence of the physical or corporeal body into a digital environment means 
something is lost in this technological resurrection from the physical to the digital state. 
While the loss of aura and authenticity as well as the ability of the digital world to transform 
human attributes are valid concerns, the commodification of the self is a vital component of 
our online transactions today. The replication of the self and its en masse dissemination is 
premised on building social capital in the virtual platforms. As such, it is less concerned with 
the loss of aura or the distortion of the corporeal body, but premises the politics of self-
representation through a primal fascination with the self and a wider economy of validation 
enabled through a public gaze.   
 
Our primal fascination with the self is further sustained through our historical and social pre-
occupation with the screen. The screen, symbolic of a certain grandeur and communal 
spectacle, occupies a space of cultural resonance for societies. The screen historically 
imagined through the romance of celluloid and distanced from the confines of domesticity 
belonged to the land of fantasy and the unattainable. Manifested through the cinema, theatre, 
television, gaming devices, computer, mobile phone, etc., the screen has become endlessly re-
invented and re-inscribed into our ordinary lives in the modern age. With the advent of 
broadcasting, the screen negotiated the domesticity of the home and over time it confronted 
the body as the site of location with the advent of mobile telephony and mobile technologies. 
The screen came to embody a more intimate domain once personalised and embedded onto 
the corporeal body. This domestication and more significantly the corporealisation of the 
screen was an important moment in the realm of communication technologies for it posited a 
realisation that we could project ourselves onto spaces where these once belonged to 
significant others. The self no longer needed to consume the screen from the outside as it 
could now be inserted inside and equally be consumed through the screen. Henceforth both 
the mirror and the screen became autoscopic devices in consuming the self.  
 
The notion of commodification of the self and the complicit nature of self objectification 
invariably invites controversy on the transformation of the self as a form of transacted 
commodity online. In terms of the capitalist critique of the internet, it reinforces the violence 
of the capitalist agenda on the internet which seeks to monetise all forms of creative and 
artistic endeavours. Nothing remains sacred, and the objectification of the self symbolises the 
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ultimate exploitation of the human spirit while presenting a false economy of empowerment 
and projecting the screen as a democratic enterprise for one and all. Criticisms from the left 
about the new media environment include producing new forms of meaning and value for 
producers and advertisers and the exploitation of consumer creativity (See Bonsu & Darmody 
2008, 365; Terranova 2000) implicating the self at the heart of value creation in the digital 
economy. The exploitation of immaterial labour through user engagements, including the 
production of the self as a material artefact, means that the self is directly entwined with this 
economy of value creation and exploitation. The commodification of the self is co-opted into 
new forms of consumerism. The violence of capitalist exploitation means the self becomes a 
transacted commodity online but as part of a complicit and compliant act where our 
fascination with the self becomes part of this endeavour to recast ourselves as content and 
commodity (Ibrahim 2008a). It‟s not just our pets that are fodder for virtual content creation, 
but so is the self.  
 
The curation of the self and the constant projection of the self online and its objectification 
also underpin a caution against an obsession with the self in modernity. Our primordial 
fascination with the self is seen as a fatal flaw in the human condition as evidenced in the 
tragic tale of Narcissus. Martin Davies (1989, 265) writing about Narcissus‟ unrequited love 
for a reflection of himself, the delusion of infatuation and his obsession with his solipsistic 
passion, observes that the myth of Narcissus is subversive for European culture. It implies 
that self-knowledge is the outcome of „strange madness,‟ culminating in the tragedy which 
then revokes the radical and archaic inspiration to know oneself (Davies 1989, 265). While 
Narcissus exposes the quest for uniqueness and the motivations for particularity, he also 
ultimately reflects the potential for self-destruction in self love, presenting a cautionary and 
enduring legacy for humanity. The notion of us relentlessly consuming ourselves in the 
virtual environment invokes the instability of our obsession with consuming ourselves online. 
In acknowledging this cardinal flaw in the human condition, we are then tacitly aware of the 
dangers of self-love and its potential for destruction. Destruction and exploitation come in 
various guises in the digital economy. What has been less evident in our discussions about 
UGC has been the exploitation of this intrinsic flaw in the human condition and capitalist 
modes of production in engaging this trait. Capital‟s recognition and exploitation of our 
fascination with the self paints a vulnerable image of humanity in the digital age. 
Nevertheless, it would be too limiting to view self-curation solely as an exploitative 
enterprise geared mainly through market forces, as it would deny the therapeutic gains which 
emerge through self-expression and community validation. It is suffice to note that capital‟s 
opportunistic alliance with self-fetishisation has not been adequately explored in existing 
literature.  
 
 
New media platforms particularly social media sites which allow us to create profiles, curate 
our identities, archive our personal memories and to post our daily thoughts and images on 
image sharing platforms perform as technologies of self where these provides new 
opportunities for identity creation and self-objectification. As Zizi Papacharissi (2011: 304-
305) observes, „online social networks constitute sites of self-presentation and identity 
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negotiation, traversing private and public spaces while connecting us to multiple audiences‟ 
where a networked self becomes conceivable. There has been a proliferation of scholarship 
which has interrogated the construction and reconstruction of self in the digital realm and its 
ubiquitous interactions with technology where the screen becomes banalized and part of the 
everyday (See Turkle 1995; Lev Manovich 2001; Bolter and Grusin 2000). As such the self is 
constantly imagined with and through new media technologies such as the screen, 
imbricating it with the politics of identity creation. Lev Manovich (2001: 94) argues that the 
society of the spectacle has given rise to the „society of the screen‟ making it omnipresent and 
a banal object of everyday life. Laura Robinson (2007) in probing the cyber self quantifies it 
as a fluid entity straddling embodiment in the physical world and immateriality in the virtual 
sphere. Sherry Turkle (1995: 180) deems the internet as a social laboratory for re-fashioning 
the self and this being a distinct element of postmodern life. As new media spaces become a 
platform for playing out our personal and cultural identities we become both subjects and 
objects (Bolter and Grusin 2000: 232). Agnès Rocamora (2011) in her discussion of blogs as 
a space for identity construction and the representation of femininity explores the screen as a 
mirror to examine women as specular objects online. She opines like mirrors, „new 
technologies have enabled, digital screens to look at oneself‟ (Rocamora 2011:416).  
 
In reviewing our insatiable appetite to consume ourselves through the metaphors of the 
mirror and screen, this chapter locates the significance of the self in the new media economy 
where we ubiquitously engage with technology; where there are numerous opportunities to 
create and curate the self through social media and user-generated content whether it be 
blogs, social networking sites or image and video sharing platforms.  The mirror and the 
screen possessing reflective and projective qualities provide a conceptual lens to understand 
the politics of self aestheticisation and the ubiquitous phenomenon of curating ourselves 
online. The chapter draws on the importance of the mirror phase of self-recognition in human 
development and equally it examines the valorisation and socialisation of the screen over 
time as an intimate object embedded onto the corporeal body in the digital age. It argues that 
modern society has a primordial relationship with both the mirror and screen and in the 
digital age these play an integral role in politics of self construction.  
 
 
 
 
Self and Presence Online 
 
The metaphysical questions about whether we really exist and discussions about 
consciousness through the separation of mind and body has saturated philosophical enquiry. 
The existence and expression of sentiments and emotions is another means by which we have 
studied consciousness and existence of human presence. The subjective feeling of existence 
within a given environment is often termed as presence or telepresence, where it is mediated 
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through technology (See Heeter 1992; Sheridan 1992; Steuer 1992). With reference to virtual 
reality, the notion of existence is quite central, where it premises on a relationship between 
one‟s psychological and physical domains (Minsky, 1980). Others such as Martin Heidegger 
(1962) and psychologist J.J. Gibson (1986) propound existence as being tied to our normal 
everyday physical environment. For J.J. Gibson, perceiving the environment then entails 
perceiving the self, where the two are reciprocally entwined. For example, when we walk 
through the environment, we perceive objects and events, and simultaneously, we perceive 
our own position and motion in relation to them. (Bahrick et al. 1996, 191). From a 
Heideggerian perspective, the concept of „enframement‟ captures technology as something 
external to the human being, yet generative from its capacities, though not part of its body 
and substance. The questioning of technology then becomes a pressing matter for its ability to 
order the world in new ways which tamper with man‟s authentic sense of being, thus 
signalling an imminent crisis for European modernity in the industrial age and hereafter. 
Technology in postmodern discourses veers beyond an external reality, where the body can 
be reordered and re-presented through technology. The conceptualisations of the posthuman 
and the cyborg are then part of this imagination, where technology infiltrates the body and 
mind through its pervasiveness and ubiquity (Pasek 2014).   
The discourse of the virtual world further complicates the idea of existence. In sociological 
discussions, when we speak about the online world and offline world, it‟s quite easy to 
assume these are separate and bounded spheres of life. But the reality of technologically-
mediated living is that online and offline worlds are increasingly enmeshed. They are not 
distinct spheres in themselves but we widely accept that our negotiations, communications 
and transactions online can require us to review our sense of identity, and in acknowledge a 
digital presence online through the traces we leave there. Whether these be images, semantic 
words, emoticons or profiles, our digital manifestations contribute towards creating a digital 
identity. Others may call it a digital footprint. The terminology being less consequential than 
the recognition that we acknowledge the existence of presence in the digital world and this 
presence can be mediated both by our offline norms and equally through new norms that 
emerge through our negotiations with technology and the architecture of the internet (Ibrahim 
2011; 2012).  
The sense of self and identity creation then become an intrinsic part of our digital presence. 
In some senses, the notion of the Cartesian duality or the separation of the mind and body is 
enacted through our disembodied presence online. This disembodied materiality online 
produces a consciousness of our existence in the virtual world, signalling a transcendence 
from the physical to the virtual world. An existence where we can watch ourselves, consume 
our digital presence and be aware of others watching us. The screen where we watch 
ourselves is just as destabilising as the mirror in which we first observe our physical 
embodiment.  The mirror as a material artefact has a long mythical and instrumental function 
in human history. Beyond its role in theories of self-recognition and awareness, the mirror in 
its ability to depict reflection is equally the basis of endless mythical narratives in human 
history. Mirrors are seen as providing more than mere reflections, casting souls and spirits 
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and being endowed with the potential power to trap them in superstitious folklores (Rochat & 
Zahavi 2011).  
 
Philippe Rochat and Dan Zahavi (2011) in writing about the „uncanny mirror and mirror self-
experience‟ contend that the unsettling experience of mirrors, particularly mirror self-
experience, appears to prevail across cultures, and is viewed as universal. The mirror and the 
human condition have an inexplicable bind. The mirror evokes a phantasmagoric illusion of 
oneself where one is always fascinated and unsettled by one‟s imagery. Psychologically, 
however, they are objects of perpetual fascination mainly because of their ability to provide 
us with reflected images of ourselves (Rochat & Zahavi 2011). According to Bahrick et al. 
(1996: 189) when a child recognises herself in the mirror for the first time, there is a certain 
mix of curiosity, excitement and equally anxiety about consuming the „mirror self‟. The self 
is probably the first and one of the most important sources of stimulation the infant 
encounters.  
 
There are diametrically differing views about how the infant perceives the self from the start. 
One argues that infants are able to perceive a differentiated self from the beginning, 
comprising of an integrated knowledge about many aspects (See Gibson 1986; Bahrick 1995; 
Bahrick et al. 1996, 190). The self then perceives itself as a unique entity with a particular 
visual appearance and physical attributes, and this sense of differentiation develops over time. 
This is in contrast to the traditional adualistic notion that the infant gradually distinguishes 
between self and its environment over time (See Mahler & Furer 1968; Piaget 1954). Jacques 
Lacan (2006) discusses the mirror phase as a point where the infant becomes aware of being a 
separate subject from other beings as it sees itself in a mirror and recognises that the mirror 
image is a reflection of itself. Despite the divergent strands, in psychoanalytical theory the 
mirror phase is a salient element of self development. Mirror self-recognition became a 
primary construct in the development of the self in early research and provided the 
conceptual basis of self-understanding (Bahrick et al. 1996, 191). 
 
Merleau-Ponty  (1964) concurs that self-recognition through the mirror symbolises a troubled 
form of self-knowledge. The mirror remains a metaphor for the dawning moment when the 
self can be objectified and alienated from the flesh, giving the child a visual presentation of 
its own body that is very different from what it can obtain by itself (Merleau-Ponty 1964, 
125). The mirror then provides the possibility to understand the body as a distinctly 
delineated object, permitting the child to see herself as seen by others. This precise moment is 
also the realisation that one is that image afforded by the mirror (Rochat & Zahavi 2011).  
 
For Lacan, this is the moment of transcendence where the reality of the live person shifts to 
the fictitious or imaginary self, as the mirror image has crafted an image torn from one‟s real 
self, instilling both an alienation and objectification of the self.  An exterior or objectified self 
emerges through the mirror. Consequently, others through the act of consumption of this 
object will tear the self away from its immediate inwardness much more surely than will the 
mirror (Merleau-Ponty 1964, 136). The mirror capture of the self is also a moment of 
realisation that the real self has an exterior dimension that can be witnessed by others 
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(Merleau-Ponty 1964, 129, 140). The moment of mirror self-recognition is an unsettling 
experience, projecting the self into an intersubjective space where „I am exposed and visible 
to others,‟ and as such this interstitial moment reinforces the alienation of the self and the 
uncanny and enigmatic quality of the specular double (Rochat & Zahavi 2011, 6). Jane 
Gallup (1982) in reading Lacan, observes that the mirror stage marks the coming of the ego 
and therefore of narcissism proper. Narcissism is love of an image of self, and the demand for 
the image of the self is achieved for the first time in the mirror stage. 
 
The virtual environment sustains and elongates that „mirror moment,‟ where we are 
entrapped by our fascination with ourselves. The digital platforms not only provide this 
moment of self-recognition and awareness online, but combine it with the potency of the 
screen. The screen in our modern civilisation is a place where we consume as a public; where 
the notion of important events and celebrities are showcased. The screen is both the space of 
dreams and representation of the real. Our connection to the mirror precedes the screen, but 
the screen stands for reality and escape, equally extending an invitation into simulated worlds 
and immersive environments where the sense of self can be re-mediated and where the body 
can be reassembled through technology.   
Prior to the internet, the screen understood through the televisual platforms of broadcasting 
and cinema signified the world of another. The screen stood for public displays, spectacle, 
forms of vicarious mobility and consumption as evident in the earlier writings on the 
television. Raymond Williams‟s (1974) notion of „mobile privatisation‟ captured this ability 
to transcend time and space through the televisual sphere, where the mind could be 
transported through moving image even while static on the couch. The television socialised 
the modern world and audiences into according an importance to the screen. Mobile 
technologies, hand-held devices and home computing broke away from communal 
consumption to the privatisation of the screen. The convergence of technologies into mobile 
telephony further enabled the screen to be a theatre for the singular individual.  
This democratisation of the screen as a people‟s platform of expression, activism and 
voyeurism in the internet age speaks about „intimatisation‟ of technology and the 
„spectacularisation of the self‟. This bodily embedding of technology through personal 
gadgets such as mobile devices means technology is not external or enframed through the 
environment as propounded by Heidegger, but becomes an extension of our sensory system 
as Nicholas Negroponte (1995) envisioned, where the „right cufflink could communicate with 
left cufflink‟. The human body is then flooded with an impossible richness of information, to 
a degree far beyond the ability of its perceptual apparatus and nervous system to receive and 
sort (cf. Massumi 1995). The privatisation of the screen enables the recasting of the self as a 
performing entity within this landscape of content overload, conveyed through the screen and 
the embedding of the technologies through the corporeal body. Sherry Turkle (2005) 
conceives the notion of the self on the computer screen as a „second self,‟ which stresses 
the relationship between the self and the machine, situating the computer as an intimate 
mind machine. Turkle dislodges the myth that the self has to be a unitary singular entity, 
but rather one that could be re-conceived and duplicated through the screen.  
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The privatisation of the screen, pleasure, and leisure reconfigured time and space, where 
consumption was no longer privileged solely through broadcasting schedules or communal 
consumption en masse. The internet re-positioned discourses of domestication of technology 
in a similar vein as the „walkman‟ when it was first introduced into the market place. As a 
portable technology embedded to the corporeal body it became an extension of the self. 
Increasingly mobile technologies have targeted the body as sites of embedding, performing 
new types of subjectivity and relationship with technology, where the latter has the power to 
extend memory, and cognitive and sensory perceptions. This corporealisation of technology 
where the bodily senses are extended through technology, signified a reconfiguration of our 
relationship with technology and equally our notions of shared time, space and sense of 
community compared to mass broadcasting.  
Prior to the internet, and with the advent of imaging technologies such as the portable 
camera, the self may be imaged and consumed in photographs or home movies, but a screen 
where the self can be projected and consumed by near and distant others heralds a different 
form of consciousness. Inserting ourselves in between the happenings of the world and 
celebrity life, the self is permitted to exist within this thrust of public attention, forming its 
own audience economy through the architecture of the web. This is an important moment for 
humanity and for the self; for it is a moment where the „mirror and screen coalesce‟ - a 
moment where the self is consumed and aestheticized through self and equally by others but 
through a screen culture.   
In Laura Mulvey‟s (1975) notion of the „gaze,‟ power relations and sexual politics were 
encoded, creating a dichotomy between the subject and the object in the politics of the screen. 
With self-representation online, Jill Walker (2005) contends there is a further coalescing of 
the object and the subject. Walker concludes that our contemporary fascination with 
reflections and shadows is an expression of our new found subjectivity as individuals able to 
represent ourselves rather than simply succumb to the generalisations of mass media (Walker 
2005, 184). The public projection of the self is an elemental aspect of digital living – where 
the recognition of our presence in the digital platforms requires us to perform for others, to 
disclose, to exhibit and to equally assuage our sense of aesthetics, identity and our 
perceptions of morality. This phenomenon of „self-curation‟ involves a complex interplay 
with the architecture of the web and through the intimate embedding of technologies on our 
corporeal body while premising our primal fascination with the self.  This impression 
management through the everyday where the presence of the self is recast through the screen 
becomes a vital part of digital living.  
The illusion of the mirror stage has been emphasised by Lacan, where it symbolises the belief 
in a projected image introducing a misrecognition and fiction in the representation of the 
specular self  (See Gallup 1982). The unified assemblage of the body in front of the mirror is 
a decisive moment of misrecognition. Similarly, the virtual space is also about morphological 
distortion. As Anne Pasek (2014) points out, virtual screen consumption is not a seamless 
replication of the body. She asserts that technology distorts the body in the transcendence 
from the physical to the virtual world. When we normalise the self in the virtual, there is 
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danger of not being critical about the critiques of mediated self-perception. Pasek (2014) 
concurs that seeing oneself is a destabilizing affair as „looking at ourselves through 
technology also seems to run the risk of cyborgic transformation-of bodies made alien or 
broken through the inorganic logic of visual media‟ (Pasek 2014). Pasek (2014) argues that 
embodied experiences can be understood as continuously incomplete, enactive, and 
contingent upon technological supports and extensions to the body‟s sensory world. She 
nevertheless argues that instead of viewing this as a form of domination or dehumanisation, it 
should be understood as a technology of perceptual introspection. The self in the digital age, 
in comparison to the mirror stage of affording a unified vision of the body, becomes re-
morphed through its digital transcendence.  
 
The Virtual as Mirror and Screen 
 
Both the mirror and the screen are equally charged with the illusory and distortionist 
qualities. The mirror like the screen enables the possibilities for envisioning another 
paradigm of reality. In tandem with this, the imagination of another world is often rife in 
studies of child psychology but equally in human beings invention of religion. The imagined 
world is often a world of possibilities; of morality; of just order and equally an inversion of 
these. The child‟s world, typified through Lewis Carroll‟s „Alice in Wonderland‟ narratives, 
inverts the reality of the mortal human world where wild and wonderful things can happen 
limited only by one‟s imagination. The rules of the physical world simply do not apply. 
Cyberspace consumed through the screen in many ways captures this urge to create another 
world through a hyper reality. Self-curation in the digital world then offers endless 
possibilities to re-invent oneself or to extend ones‟ sense of self.  
Our early conceptions of the virtual world imagined it as unadulterated terrain freed from the 
impositions of the real world where liberty, freedom and enterprise can flourish without 
capitalist pursuits or the governance of nation-states. It acquired the discourse of the moral 
alternative, but one that could be readily available while we lived out our mortal lives, unlike 
the afterlife.  The birth of the internet marked a moment of unfettered imagination and 
possibilities. William Gibson (1993) calls cyberspace a „consensual hallucination‟, while 
Joyce McDougall (1986) terms it the „psychic theatre,‟ where the more primitive instincts and 
desires could be enacted. The self and the re-birthing of the self were equally imagined in 
these possibilities. With the virtual space we could reinvent identities or equally relinquish 
these if we so pleased with pseudo-identities or even anonymity in the online world. Self and 
our real identities could be uncoupled and this was deemed as liberating in the initial 
discourses of the internet. Unlike the afterlife imagined in religious belief systems, in the 
virtual world you can be present as data and as content even after death, possessing an 
ineradicable quality defying time and space and equally the mortality of the physical world.  
The advent of social networking sites (SNS) fused online and offline identities where these 
were discussed as bounded spheres prior to it. Equally, the conscious effort to create and 
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communicate identities has been much discussed with the advent of social networking sites. 
The creation of a profile culture and the need to sustain identities through our everyday life 
activities and our ability to comment on the world and others through platforms like Twitter, 
Flickr, Youtube or Instagram constitute our endeavours to be in the world. Other image 
platforms and the convergence of technologies also allowed us to communicate relentlessly 
through the image. Hogan (2010, 377) argues that self-presentation can be split into 
performances, which take place in synchronous “situations,” and artefacts, which take place 
in asynchronous „exhibitions‟. Social media, on the other hand, frequently employs 
exhibitions, such as lists of status updates and sets of photos, alongside situational activities, 
such as chatting. A key difference in exhibitions is the virtual “curator” that manages and 
redistributes this digital content. Social Networking Sites through their emphasis on profile 
creation and communication through social networks and friendships inscribed both the 
screen and the mirror into these transactions.  
 
The self can be transformed into the „selfie,‟ where mobile technologies allow us to 
photograph ourselves without elaborate paraphernalia and with the click of a button. The self 
becomes an object we can aestheticize, consume and curate online. The manufacture of the 
self and its presentation to others has been enmeshed into a reciprocal sociality where it 
becomes part of gift-giving and communicating presence online. Self-curation is also 
invariably tied to a wider economy of community validation, followers and popularity of 
hashtags and downloads. Consumption and validation by a wider community are elements 
which shape the ways in which we curate ourselves. The aestheticisation of the our daily lives 
and our need to share it with others through the selfie means that the self is narrated through 
its ordinariness (See Ibrahim 2015). This banal imaging of our everyday enables us to 
manufacture and consume ourselves on the screen, ascribing a narrative and the potential to 
imagine and consume ourselves both through our notions of reality and beyond.  
 
If the virtual space unleashed an imaginary world for the modern civilisation, it is also a 
space which signifies an insatiable appetite for content. With the economy relying on user-
generated content (UGC) to produce artefacts and commentaries, to contribute to knowledge, 
to offer reviews and to share experiences, the sense of self as contributing to a wider world 
became a productive component of the new media economy. The contribution one makes 
through one‟s vantage point or view points, sense of aesthetics or the offering of oneself to 
public consumption asserts the salience of the self to the digital economy. The proliferation 
of UGC and the ability to document ourselves as selfies and to publish our experiences non-
stop made the „self‟ an object of enquiry and a subject of the digital economy providing 
immaterial labour while appropriating agency and empowerment from self-expression and 
exhibition.  Our primal fascination with the self plays to the agenda of capital working to 
accumulate content and traffic that could be stripped from the human or its corporeal 
counterpart. Capital recognises the flaws in the human condition and our propensity towards 
indulging the self.  
The self is then not beyond exploitation in this economy but self-curation or the conscious 
decision to preserve and exhibit one‟s presence online asserts forms of agency despite the 
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internet‟s tendency to create a data trail and extract data from the transactions we leave 
online. Gallup (1982, 120) argues that the mirror stage is a turning point. After this, the 
subject's relation to himself is always mediated through a totalising image which has come 
from outside (Gallup 1982, 120). But this totalising quality becomes fragmented on the 
screen when the self is disambiguated through bits and bytes. If the mirror presented an 
image which alienated and abstracted from the flesh of the real body, the internet morphed 
the body into data sets which could personalise the body while crafting the transactions of the 
self as part of a big data economy. Negroponte‟s premonition of the body overloaded with 
information and data also envisaged a reality of humans being turned into data extrapolated 
from their disembodied presence. The internet consumed through the screen disambiguates 
the human form, pressing it through its data algorithms and archives, decontextualized from 
its meanings and imagery (Ibrahim 2008b). The human form becomes the palimpsest for 
small and big data and in the process it reveals our ongoing love affair with both the screen 
and the mirror.  
 
Conclusion 
This chapter employs the concepts of the mirror and screen to discuss the complexities of 
self-curation in the digital economy. The mirror and the screen have a long-established 
relationship with humanity and society. The moment of self-recognition is an important 
milestone in human development and is a seismic moment, symbolic of reproduction of the 
corporeal body as a whole. The screen, on other hand, is associated with the unattainable, 
where bigger life events happen. The convergence of the technologies has enabled the self to 
become commodified and represented inside the screen and become part of the screen, 
enabling us to watch ourselves.  The coalescing of the mirror and screen is a potent moment, 
for it evokes our primal love and fascination with the self while unleashing the self within the 
digital economy where it is amenable to wider processes of consumption and re-aggregation 
into commercial pursuits. Here it can be re-morphed into data and stripped of its corporeality 
to be re-absorbed into the digital terrain. Our primordial relationship with the mirror and 
screen provide a lens to understand both our vulnerabilities and our insatiable need to 
consume ourselves in the digital economy.  
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